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Executive summary
Key messages:
–  Integrating climate risks into financial decision-making  
is crucial to long-term economic and financial stability  
as these risks affect return on investment. Broader 
recognition of these risks will be necessary for  
sustainable development.
–  For every USD 10 paid in interest by developing countries, 
an additional dollar will be spent due to climate vulnerability. 
This financial burden exacerbates the  
present-day economic challenges of poorer countries.  
The magnitude of this burden will at least double over  
the next decade.
–  The climate consequences on poorer countries’ cost of 
capital and overall fiscal health need to be addressed. A 
range of existing policy and market responses can build 
climate resilience in vulnerable countries and deliver 
demonstrable financial benefits.
–  Investments that enhance the resilience of climate 
vulnerable countries are crucial to not only helping 
vulnerable countries deal with the consequences of  
climate risks, but also bring down their cost of borrowing.
Core research findings:
–  Our econometric modeling suggests that climate 
vulnerability has already raised the average cost of debt 
in a sample of developing countries by 117 basis points. 
In absolute terms, this translates into USD 40 billion in 
additional interest payments over the past 10 years on 
government debt alone. 
–  Incorporating higher sovereign borrowing rates into the 
cost of private external debt, we estimate that climate 
vulnerability has cost these countries USD 62 billion in 
higher interest payments across the public and private 
sectors. We expect the additional interest payments 
attributable to climate vulnerability to increase to between 
USD 146 – 168 billion over the next decade.
–  Investments in social preparedness can partially mitigate  
the impacts of climate vulnerability on sovereign borrowing 
rates by increasing the social and economic resilience  
of countries. 
–  Cooperative efforts to measure, monitor, and transfer  
climate risks provide an opportunity to prevent a 
deterioration of sovereign borrowing capacity in affected 
countries. Monitoring the financial indicators used by 
the major rating agencies is a crucial tool for anticipating 
impacts on sovereign credit profiles.
This report represents the first systematic effort to assess the 
relationship between climate vulnerability, sovereign credit 
profiles, and the cost of capital in developing countries. Climate 
risks are multi-dimensional, covering a range of geophysical, 
social, and economic issues. The intensification of these risks 
and the degree to which they are accurately priced by financial 
markets are of increasing concern to global economic stability.
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Introduction
This study investigates whether climate change is impacting 
on the rate at which countries can borrow from international 
debt capital markets. We focus on physical climate risks that 
have the potential to undermine a country’s sovereign credit 
profile. Our analysis considers countries that are members of 
the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF). 
The CVF was established in 2009 as an 'international 
partnership of countries highly vulnerable to a warming 
planet'.¹ The concept of Vulnerable 20 countries (V20) arose 
from the Climate Vulnerable Forum’s Costa Rica Action Plan 
in 2015. By March 2018, member nations of the CVF and V20 
had risen to total of 48 countries.2 
Figure 1. V20 countries 
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–  First, to analyze the impact of climate change on the cost of 
debt capital for climate-vulnerable countries, through the 
analysis of potential impacts on sovereign credit ratings.
–  Second, to quantify any change in cost of capital in  
climate-vulnerable countries and forecast such changes 
into the future. 
–  Third, to discuss policy interventions at the national  
and international scale that could mitigate potential  
fiscal impacts. 
The key aims of the research are: 
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Figure 2. Relationship between physical climate  
impacts and country-level financial indicators
Our study investigates whether physical climate risks 
currently are incorporated in country-level credit ratings 
and sovereign bond yields of V20 countries. We employ a 
mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to explore the 
mechanisms by which physical climate impacts may impair 
fiscal health. Our work concludes with a set of case studies 
that identify the mechanisms by climate change impacts that 
manifest themselves as financial risks. We consider three 
physical impacts in five countries: 
Flooding – Vietnam and Bangladesh 
Drought – Guatemala and Kenya 
Severe weather events – Barbados 
While there is a substantial body of research on the economic 
impacts of climate change on developing countries, there 
has been very little work to date on translating estimates of 
economic loss into fiscal measures. Our analysis seeks to 
isolate how climate change may impact the rate of interest 
demanded by investors on government-issued debt.
Our analysis focuses exclusively on the physical impacts 
of climate change, such as extreme weather shocks and 
severe climatic trends, which have the potential to impair 
country-level credit ratings and increase sovereign bond 
yields. We do not address broader impacts of climate change, 
such as carbon pricing, technological disruption, and shifts 
in consumer demand. While these 'transition risks' will 
likely have equal, and in some cases greater, impact on the 
fiscal health of developing countries, the methodologies 
for quantifying these impacts are only now emerging for 
country-level analysis. A study by HSBC³ is a notable example 
of recent work in this area. 
This report discusses three closely related topics. They are 
climate impacts, climate vulnerability, and climate risks. We 
define climate impacts as the physical manifestations of 
man-made climate change. 
They include rising sea levels, increased coastal flooding, and 
increased incidence of drought. Climate impacts generate 
economic costs. Climate vulnerability is an aggregate 
measure of a country’s propensity to be affected by climate 
change. Climate vulnerability encompasses the level of 
sensitivity (as determined by geographic, demographic and 
economic factors) as well as the capacity to cope and adapt. 
Finally, climate risks are negative financial outcomes that 
are attributable to man-made climate change. While it has 
become commonplace to speak of 'climate risk' as a catch-
all phrase in financial markets, the use of the singular term 
is, in fact, a gross simplification. Climate risks are highly 
heterogeneous and affect economic sectors in different ways. 
For example, the loss of oil revenues from a shift to electric 
vehicles (a transition risk) bears little resemblance to loss of 
fisheries revenues from ocean acidification (a physical risk). 
Quantifying climate change as a priced risk factor in financial 
markets therefore requires specification of unique variables. 
In this study, we define climate risk as the marginal increase 
in the rate of interest on sovereign debt that is attributable to 
national climate vulnerability. 
In the sections that follow, we address the following questions 
regarding this climate risk in developing countries:
Do credit rating agencies perceive a relationship between 
climate change and a country’s cost of sovereign borrowing? 
Can the cost of climate vulnerability be quantified within 
sovereign borrowing rates? 
What policies might alleviate the impact of climate change  
on the cost of borrowing?
Figure 2. below, provides a simplified schematic of the 
relationship between physical climate impacts and country-
level financial indicators, as explored in this report. 
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In summary
To date, no downgrade by a major credit rating agency has been attributed to climate 
risks. As the major rating agencies do not generally itemize climate risks in their 
published country assessments, sovereign credit ratings are likely to be incorporating 
these risks in their assessments, but capturing them in other areas. At the sovereign 
level, climate change is an asymmetrical, downside risk. If climate-related rating 
actions are taken in the future, as the agencies themselves have indicated is likely, 
these actions will almost certainly be negative.
2. Climate change and sovereign credit ratings
Credit ratings are an assessment of the credit risk of a 
borrower. There is a strong relationship between sovereign 
credit ratings and the market rate of interest. Understanding 
how ratings agencies measure (or might measure) climate 
impacts is vital for understanding real or potential climate 
change vulnerability in financial markets. 
Rating agencies have recently begun to take note of climate 
change and its potential role in credit assessment. Rating 
agency comments have suggested that a range of sovereign 
issuers, particularly emerging market sovereign issuers, are 
potentially vulnerable to negative rating actions as a result 
of climate impacts. Rating agencies have also noted that 
mitigating factors potentially could offset these negative 
climate trends. 
Moody’s has neatly summarized the types of climate  
impacts likely to be felt by countries:
"The physical effects of climate change can be broadly 
grouped into two categories: climate shocks and climate 
trends. Climate shocks, in the form of storms, floods, 
droughts, and other climate-related disasters, are acute, 
costly and more conspicuous than trends. While climate 
trends including higher global temperatures and rising sea 
levels are multi-decade phenomena and less visible from 
one year to the next, one of the manifestations of climate 
trends is a higher frequency of shocks."4
Rating agencies such as S&P Global Ratings (S&P) and 
Moody’s, whose role in capital markets is to assess the 
relative likelihood of the ability of borrowers to repay debt 
obligations, are aware of the potential risks posed by climate 
change. S&P has noted in a recent report that “climate 
change, in particular, could have significant implications 
for sovereign ratings in the decades to come”.5 In addition, 
both agencies have published occasional research pieces 
on particular climate topics. For example, Moody’s recently 
published a report on climate risks potentially affecting small 
island nations.6 Nonetheless, climate risks have not yet been 
specifically indicated in Sovereign Ratings Methodologies, 
the formal criteria published by rating agencies that 
delineate the factors relevant to credit rating assessment, 
although S&P includes vulnerability to 'constant natural 
disasters or adverse weather conditions,' areas where some 
climate impacts will manifest themselves, in its recently 
updated methodologies.7
More specifically, both Moody’s and S&P have published 
several reports on the potential credit impacts of natural 
catastrophes,⁸ although we note that natural catastrophes 
and climate impacts are not interchangeable terms.  
Changes in climate affect both average temperatures and 
extreme temperatures, and climate change is increasing the 
risk of natural catastrophes such as extreme weather events, 
including droughts, flooding and heat waves.⁹ However, 
natural catastrophes such as earthquakes and the  
incidence of tsunamis are unaffected by climate impacts. 
In its studies focused specifically on the impact of climate 
change on sovereign credit ratings, S&P has indicated that 
climate change could become a factor in credit profiles at 
the sovereign level, especially for lower-rated emerging 
market countries. S&P also noted that the ratings pressure 
created by climate change factors would be negative.10 
However, the agency noted that this was not likely to be 
a near-term event within the current five-year horizon 
of sovereign credit ratings. Moody’s has made similar 
comments about the increased vulnerability of lower-rated 
countries, noting that “In general, sovereign issuers with 
smaller, less diversified economies and geographies, lower 
incomes and quality of infrastructure, and lower fiscal 
flexibility are more susceptible to the credit implications  
of climate change”.11
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In a recent report, Moody’s itemized those areas relevant  
to sovereign credit profiles where climate impacts might  
be expected to materialize:
We identify four primary channels by which the effects  
of physical climate change are transmitted to sovereigns' 
credit profiles. These are: 1) the potential economic impact 
(for example, weaker activity due to a loss of agricultural 
production); 2) damage to infrastructure assets as a direct 
result of the physical destruction incurred from climate 
shocks; 3) rising social costs brought about, for example,  
by a health crisis or food security concerns; and 4) 
population shifts due to forced displacements resulting  
from climate change.12
Even more recently, Moody’s has expanded its list of climate-
vulnerable countries, and notes, “A common characteristic 
among the most susceptible sovereigns is their economic 
reliance on the agricultural sector, which is typically not 
irrigated and is thus rain-fed. In addition, undiversified 
economies are disproportionately affected by the increasing 
frequency and/or severity of natural disasters impacting 
growth and causing lasting damage to infrastructure”.13  
As we demonstrate in our case studies, agriculture is 
particularly vulnerable to climate risks and a corresponding 
loss of economic resilience, and as a result may also provide 
the best indicators of evolving climate risks in some countries.
In practice, climate risks are rarely discussed in individual 
country reports, or in rating actions, although these risks  
are the subject of numerous general commentaries. When 
they are, these are almost always situation-specific. For 
example, Moody’s has recently commented that Cape 
Town’s credit profile could come under stress in the event 
the ongoing drought in South Africa persists.14 An ongoing 
Brazilian drought was discussed by S&P in a comment on 
Brazil’s electricity distribution system, in 2016.15 Bangalore’s 
water issues have been well documented;16 and, in fact, 
Moody’s discussed India’s water and drought issues in 
general in 2015.17 
In a joint report from the UN Environment Finance Initiative 
and the Global Footprint Network in 2012 on integrating 
ESG issues into sovereign credit analysis,18 the authors 
note the paucity of comments from ratings agencies at 
the time. A second report in 2016 noted that while rating 
agencies had issued some reports on potential impacts of 
climate change on credit quality, “Research on the broader 
economic impacts of long-term environmental degradation 
is, however, still rare”.19 However, it is now clear that both 
S&P and Moody’s are becoming increasingly vigilant about 
climate impacts and their possible fiscal and economic 
consequences.
 
Figure 3. Sovereign issuer credit rating framework 
Five key areas to determine a sovereign's creditworthiness
Source: S&P Global Ratings, Sovereign Rating Methodology, 18 December 2017
Institutional 
assessment
Institutional and 
economic profile
Flexibility and 
performance profile
Indicative  
rating level
Economic 
assessment
External 
assessment
Fiscal 
assessment
Monetary 
assessment
Foreign-currency 
issuer credit rating
Supplemental adjustment 
factors and one notch of 
uplift/downlift if applicable
Generally zero to one notch 
of uplift
Local-currency 
issuer credit rating
04
3. Climate vulnerability and the cost of sovereign borrowing 
The frequency of natural catastrophes has increased 
significantly over the past 50 years. While the causes of 
these hazards are complex, there is widespread consensus 
in the scientific community that anthropogenic climate 
change has led to an increase in temperatures of oceans 
and the atmosphere, which have contributed to an increase 
in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events.20 
Figure 4 shows a pronounced increase in droughts, extreme 
temperatures, floods, landslides and storms since the 1970s.
Figure 4. Number of weather-related catastrophes, 1900–2017
Source: Compiled with data from EM-DAT: The Emergency Events Database – Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) –CRED, 
D. Guha-Sapir – www.emdat.be, Brussels, Belgium, 2018.
Note: The count includes events that meet at least one of the following criteria: (i) 10 or more people reported as dead, (ii) 100 
people reported as affected, (iii) a declaration of a state of emergency, or (iv) a call for international assistance.
In summary
Our analysis confirms that countries with higher vulnerability to climate change 
risk bear an incremental cost on government-issued debt. These costs are above 
and beyond the rates attributable to macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals. 
This incremental debt yield carries over into the cost of private debt. Greater social 
preparedness mitigates this source of risk to developing countries, but only partially. 
Our findings distinguish between the economic losses V20 countries suffer from 
climate change, and the fiscal burdens they carry due to their exposure to climate 
vulnerability. Recognizing climate vulnerability in investment decision-making will help 
direct financial resources more effectively. Further strengthening of national adaption 
capacity and resilience is an appropriate response to climate-related fiscal impacts.
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Figure 5 shows the increase in economic losses due to major 
weather-related events over the last five decades, which 
also displays a clear trend.21 As documented in a range of 
economic studies, future increase in climate-related natural 
disasters could have large negative effects on economic 
growth.22 While natural disasters do not always negatively 
impact GDP growth, when they do, the negative impacts are 
larger for developing countries.23
V20 countries are particularly exposed to the effects of 
climate change. Between 1997 and 2016, major weather 
events negatively impacted the national incomes of Tuvalu, 
Grenada, the Marshall Islands and Kiribati by over 6% a 
year.24 Although there are large differences between the 
highly diverse members, this is not just a matter of economic 
statistics. Extreme weather events also entail substantial 
human fatalities. Figure 6 and Table 1 illustrate the burden to 
selected V20 countries from extreme weather events over the 
last 20 years.
Figure 5. Total economic losses due to major weather-related events (insured and uninsured),  
USD inflation adjusted, 1970–2017
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Figure 6. 20-year average fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants and percentage GDP losses due to major  
weather events, 1997–2016
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Source: Compiled with data from Germanwatch’s Global Climate Risk Index database. 
Note: V20 countries selected on the basis of available data in 2016.
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Table 1. V20 average annual weather-related human fatalities and economic losses, 1997–2016
 
Country
Score Rank Rank Avg AvgAvg Avg Rank Rank
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Maldives
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12.2
13.5
20.2
26.5
31.8
34.0
34.3
37.8
37.8
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44.2
45.8
55.5
56.0
59.3
59.5
61.0
66.8
67.7
69.7
75.5
76.3
77.0
77.2
78.8
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95.5
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98.0
103.0
104.2
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113.5
114.2
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122.5
126.7
127.0
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142.7
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8
54
2
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2
57
49
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1
8
24
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5
0
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6
2
8
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0
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0
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4
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2
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58
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4.3
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2.3
0.7
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1.9
1.0
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418.8
2,893.4
2,311.1
2,029.8
243.5
402.9
196.4
119.5
242.7
78.5
100.3
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Source: Compiled with data from Germanwatch’s Global Climate Risk Index (CRI) database. 
Note: Countries are ranked out of 182. Losses in USD purchasing power parity.
The lower the CRI score, the higher a country’s level of exposure and vulnerability to extreme events.
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While a growing literature has investigated the impact of 
climate change on economic growth and estimated the 
economic losses associated with extreme weather events,25 
there is a dearth of research that investigates the effect of 
climate vulnerability on the cost of sovereign debt. The cost at 
which governments can access finance does not only affect 
their ability to invest in climate mitigation and adaptation, but 
also has a range of negative spillover effects. A high cost of 
capital in the public sector constrains social investments in 
areas such as infrastructure, education and public health. 
The governmental cost of borrowing also acts as a proxy 
for the country risk premium, which has direct ramifications 
on investments undertaken by the private sector. Empirical 
evidence has shown that the most critical variable affecting 
the Weighted Average Cost of Capital – which is a crucial 
variable for investment appraisal – is the sovereign risk 
assigned to each country.26 Understanding the extent to 
which climate vulnerability impacts the sovereign cost of 
borrowing is not just vital for helping to develop appropriate 
policies at the sovereign level, but also to develop appropriate 
policies and mechanisms for unlocking private finance.
Methodology
To formally investigate the relationship between climate 
vulnerability, adaption capacity and the cost of sovereign 
debt, we calculated bond yields for 46 countries. The 
sample is made up of a selection of V20 countries, the 
Group of Seven (G7) and a group of middle-to-low income 
countries not in the V20. Among the V20 countries, 
our sample includes 17 countries with openly traded 
debt.27 It also includes an additional eight V20 member 
countries whose yields can be tracked using multilateral 
concessionary bond yield observations from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The complete group 
of countries is shown in Table 8. Estimation and testing is 
conducted within the sample period 1996-2016.
We developed a linear econometric model with a series 
of macroeconomic control variables, including per 
capita income (on a purchasing power parity basis), 
gross government debt to GDP, government revenue 
as share of GDP, government expenditure as share of 
GDP, the government’s primary balance as share of GDP, 
consumer price inflation, and foreign direct investment as 
share of GDP, to gauge the effects of climate vulnerability 
on sovereign bond yields.28 Our model employs the 
Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) to 
generate our variables for climate vulnerability and social 
preparedness.29 It is currently the most comprehensive  
and granular database for these purposes.
ND-GAIN has three sub-components of interest for 
this study – they are the Sensitivity index, the Capacity 
index and the Social Readiness index. The ND-GAIN 
sensitivity index, which acts as our proxy for climate 
vulnerability, is based on 12 measures.30 We combine 
this statistically with the ND-GAIN capacity index, which 
is based on a further 12 measures, using principal 
component analysis.31 The ND-GAIN Social Readiness 
index acts as our proxy for country-level climate 
preparedness. It comprises variables including social 
inequality, information and communications technology 
infrastructure, education, and economic innovation.  
The data for the indices are drawn from the United 
Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World 
Health Organization, the World Bank, and peer-reviewed 
academic research.32
Further details on the methodology and the data 
are presented in Appendix 1, along with the main 
estimation results. A technical paper with details of 
this analysis and a detailed description of all variables 
used is available online https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3198093 33
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Table 2. Empirical model sample countries
Source: Compiled with data on outstanding debt in 2016 from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
Note: External total debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, private non-guaranteed, use of IMF credit and short term 
debt – that is owed to non-residents.
 
Country
Type of debt cost observation Outstanding debt 2016 (V20 only), in USD billions
Marketable External totalMultilateral Public & guaranteed Multilateral
 
V20 member
Argentina
Bangladesh
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Canada
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Egypt
Ethiopia
Fiji
France
Germany
Ghana
Guatemala
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Kenya
Lebanon
Malawi
Maldives
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
Rwanda
Senegal
South Africa
Tanzania
Thailand
Tunisia
United Kingdom
United States
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Total
41.1
2.8
120.3
25.6
28.0
23.1
0.9
21.4
21.2
7.6
22.3
32.0
1.8
1.2
23.9
46.3
4.3
77.3
19.7
2.8
6.6
16.5
28.1
0.2
87.0
661.9
28.6
2.5
70.9
11.1
17.2
21.8
0.7
17.0
8.1
6.0
18.3
27.2
1.5
0.9
4.5
30.1
3.6
33.4
1.9
2.4
6.1
11.2
18.3
0.1
48.0
391.7
26.5
2.5
6.8
1.2
1.8
15.8
0.3
8.7
1.3
3.4
12.7
0.8
1.5
0.7
2.1
9.0
3.6
8.4
1.2
1.9
4.9
9.1
5.5
0.1
35.0
164.8
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Results
Our econometric analysis provides evidence regarding the 
impact of climate vulnerability on the cost of sovereign debt. 
We estimate a linear model to explain sovereign bond yields 
using a set of control variables. We link measures of climate 
vulnerability and social preparedness with cost of debt. Our 
primary conclusion is that countries with higher degrees of 
climate vulnerability face higher sovereign borrowing costs. 
Our econometric analysis finds that climate vulnerability, after 
controlling for a range of potentially confounding variables, 
has a positive and significant impact on sovereign yields. 
We also find that measures of social preparedness have a 
negative and significant effect on bond yields. 
The main findings are illustrated in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 
7 shows that countries with greater sensitivity to climate 
impacts tend to have higher sovereign borrowing costs. 
Figure 8 shows that countries that are well prepared to deal 
with the risks of climate change enjoy low borrowing costs; 
less well-prepared countries are often encumbered by high 
cost of debt.
Figure 7. Cost of debt and ND-GAIN Sensitivity index, 2016
Source: Compiled with data from Bloomberg and ND-Gain.
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Source: Authors’ own work, based on own estimations with data compiled from Bloomberg, ND-GAIN, IMF and the UN.
Figure 8. Cost of debt and ND-GAIN Social Readiness index, 1996–2016
Source: Compiled with data from Bloomberg and ND-GAIN. 
Note: Excludes multilateral debt.
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Figure 9 shows our base estimate of the expected cost of 
sovereign debt based on macroeconomic control variables 
for V20 countries. On average the model predicts a base cost 
of debt of 12.40%. Climate vulnerability increases the cost of 
debt, on average, by 117 basis points.34
This increase is considerable, representing an uplift of nearly 
10% on overall interest costs. Our modeling suggests that 
investing in social preparedness reduces the cost of debt by 
67 basis points, on average. 
Figure 9. Estimated impact on cost of debt
12.40%
Base Climate vulnerability Preparedness Study sample mean
1.17% -0.67% 
12.90% 
Based on our empirical analysis, we estimate that over 
the last 10 years, climate vulnerability has cost the V20 
countries over USD 62 billion in higher external interest 
payments. This figure includes more than USD 40 billion 
in additional interest payments over the past 10 years 
on government debt alone. Our model estimates this 
incremental debt cost for the V20 countries was almost 
USD 9 billion in 2016 alone. 
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The use of macroeconomic and fiscal controls, such as GDP 
per capita and government primary balance, means that 
we have adjusted for differences in both wealth and fiscal 
policies. To test the robustness of the results, we re-ran the 
analysis using the US Treasury bond yield as a control for the 
risk-free rate and made a maturity adjustment to examine 
the impact of variations in bond maturities. The statistical 
results were largely unchanged. We also used the share 
of agricultural value added as a percentage of GDP as an 
alternative measure of climate vulnerability, with the results 
being very similar. Such a measure is correlated with the 
development of countries over time as well as the fact that 
the agricultural sector is particularly vulnerable to climate 
change. Our findings from the technical analysis are robust to 
alternative econometric approaches.
Our estimate of total additional interest payments is gained by 
multiplying the marginal cost of debt to the stock of external 
debt outstanding amongst V20 countries. We use the stock of 
outstanding external public, publicly guaranteed and private 
debt as reported by the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database over the 10-year period 2007 to 2016.35 
Our estimate is a lower bound as many V20 countries face 
financial exclusion.36 Moreover, indirect effects of climate 
on macroeconomic variables are not considered, only direct 
impact. Furthermore, we use historic debt levels understating 
current levels of debt, given that we are estimating the 
cumulative effect over the last 10 years. The 25 V20 countries 
sampled in our empirical model reflect 86% of the external debt 
reported by the World Bank for the 48 countries of the V20.
In Figure 10, we chart the historical increase in the cost of 
debt associated with climate risk as well as three scenarios 
for how it might develop over the next decade. 
The low case Scenario A employs the central forecast for 
emerging market GDP growth in the IMF’s most recent World 
Economic Outlook. The IMF estimate of GDP growth extends 
to 2022, after which we have applied a slight deceleration to 
2028. We apply a constant marginal cost of debt associated 
with climate vulnerability (1.17%) and a stable debt to GDP 
ratio. Scenario B allows total indebtedness to grow 1% faster 
than GDP. Scenario C assumes that the interest rate premium 
associated with climate vulnerability grows by 1% each year, 
thereby increasing in absolute terms by 1.7 basis points per 
annum. This would be consistent with the rising frequency 
and severity of catastrophes, and higher volatility in fiscal 
revenues and expenditures as countries attempt to absorb 
and address changes in climate. Scenario A implies a  
10-year incremental climate risk debt costs of USD 146 billion 
for the period 2019-2028. The forecast estimates are  
USD 156 billion for Scenario B and USD 168 billion for 
Scenario C, respectively.
Figure 10. Forecasted increases in annual interest costs due to climate vulnerability, 2007–2028
Source: Authors’ own work, based on own estimations with data compiled from Bloomberg, ND-GAIN, IMF, 
the UN and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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4. Country case studies
With a better understanding of the overall financial impact 
 of climate vulnerability on developing countries, we also 
need to assess how the risks will manifest themselves  
for individual countries, particularly in terms of not only  
the physical risks themselves, but also in terms of the 
financial and economic impacts that may affect sovereign 
governments' ability to address these risks. This is a 
necessary condition for determining how these countries will 
develop policies and programmes, perhaps with international 
assistance, to reduce the impacts of these risks.
While all countries have some measure of climate 
vulnerability, some countries’ situations are particularly 
acute. These differences reflect factors such as the 
country’s physical size and population, its overall wealth, 
its existing infrastructure, and the relative effectiveness of 
its government. For highly vulnerable countries, there is a 
clear need to monitor the climate risks that impact upon 
national credit assessment and market responses by the 
bond markets. The purpose of this section is to identify 
specific physical climate risks that have the potential to lead 
to actions by ratings agencies such as Moody’s and S&P, 
and to suggest potential mitigating actions that may reduce 
the likelihood of such actions. While rating agencies factor 
climate risks only generally in their approach to sovereign 
ratings, we believe they also will factor any positive impacts 
of adaptation or mitigation activity on relevant economic or 
fiscal indicators into their credit assessments. 
For each country considered in these case studies,  
we highlight one particular physical climate risk and its 
potential impacts. We consider economic indicators that  
can be monitored to evaluate the impact of each risk over 
time. We take as our model the notion of a 'keystone species' 
discussed by ecologists in ecosystem analysis: the particular 
species that either dominates, or exemplifies the health  
and resilience of, a particular ecosystem. For each of our  
case studies, we propose a climate impact and a physical 
indicator that will exemplify that impact, either fiscally or 
economically. We propose that the relative health of that 
physical variable can be taken to represent the relative 
degree of physical resilience underlying a country’s  
social and economic resilience.
Our basic model is shown in Figure 11. While we recognize 
that most countries face a number of climate risks, we 
believe this simplified approach to assessing the potential 
credit impacts of climate risks could prove useful for affected 
countries. We note that assessing a broader range of risks, 
a process that would more realistically capture the range of 
impacts that countries are experiencing, would involve more 
complex analysis. However, we believe that any such analysis 
will embody the approach taken here.
For each country considered in these case studies, we highlight one particular climate risk and its potential impacts.  
We consider economic indicators that can be monitored to evaluate the impact of each risk over time. Our basic model is 
shown in Figure 11.
Climate risk
Manifesting as 
physical impacts
Some of which 
have economic 
impacts
Some of which 
will affect the 
sovereign credit 
profile
Leading to 
possible rating 
actions
Figure 11
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4.1 Bangladesh
Current S&P Ratings assessment: BB- (Foreign long-term 
rating)/BB- (Domestic long-term ratings)
Climate risk assessed: River flooding
Key near-term indicators:
Rice production levels and yields
River salinization
Food inflation
Longer-term climate issues:
Sea level rise
Increased frequency and severity of tropical storms
Storm surge severity
Economic vulnerabilities
Bangladesh’s economy is beginning to diversify thanks 
to growth in its service and manufacturing sectors. The 
garments industry accounted for nearly 85% of total goods 
exports in US dollar terms in 2016.37 Agriculture generates 
15% of GDP, but its relevance to daily life in Bangladesh is far 
greater as it provides employment to 42% of the population.38
Bangladesh is the world’s fourth largest producer of rice at 
30 million tons/year, but almost all of it goes on domestic 
consumption. The country still needs to import rice, 
alongside other staples such as wheat.39 The national food 
staple accounts for 75% of all cropping areas. Similarly, 
Bangladesh’s fisheries sector currently contributes around 
4% to GDP, while providing 55% of animal protein intake  
in Bangladesh.41 
In summary
Bangladesh’s credit rating is likely to come under pressure in the event of sustained 
rice production declines from climate change – either from salinization or from 
increased freshwater flooding. The impact of such declines would negatively 
affect critical measures of focus for rating agencies, including possible increased 
government borrowing, increased domestic food inflation, and deteriorating external 
trade balances. More aggressive efforts to limit rice production declines consequently 
are crucial to the long-term stability of Bangladesh’s credit profile, and its ability to 
borrow internationally.
Physical indicator
Reduced 
freshwater 
and 
salinization
Rice 
production
Rice  
imports
Economic indicator Rating indicator reviews
Government 
borrowing
Fiscal  
assessment
Current account 
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External 
assessment
Food 
inflation
Economic  
assessment
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Figure 12. contribution to GDP by sector in Bangladesh, 1995-2016
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Government debt to GDP has been steadily declining over 
the past decade, reducing from 37% in 2008 to about 27% in 
2016, suggesting some room for additional debt issuance. 
However, government interest payments on debt still account 
for nearly 20% of revenues per year.42 Bangladesh runs a 
trade deficit of about 5% of GDP. Any major disruption to 
agriculture has the potential to create significant social 
pressures requiring increases in government spending. 
Domestic inflation remains a concern as well, particularly 
relating to food prices. Overall inflation hit a high in 2011 of 
16%. Food price inflation, which reached over 9% in 2014, 
has more recently settled at around 7%. 
Source: Compiled with data from the World Bank.
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Climate vulnerabilities 
Flooding causes considerable economic dislocation, with 
concomitant impacts on government spending. Bangladesh 
ranks 160 out of 181 countries in the ND-GAIN Country 
index,43 with very low rankings on both vulnerability and 
readiness. At a rank of 167 for the ND Readiness index,  
it is the 25th least ready country, and the 37th most 
vulnerable with a rank of 159 for the ND Vulnerability index. 
The ND-GAIN ranking has remained unchanged over the 
past two decades, with a mild improvement in Vulnerability 
being offset by a decline in readiness, particularly economic 
readiness, derived from a World Bank indicator measuring 
openness to external investment. As the World Bank has 
noted, climate-related risks are likely to depress agricultural 
activity by about 3% annually through 2050.44 River flooding 
is a significant climate risk, largely because Bangladesh 
contains the second largest river basin in the world. 80%  
of the country is on floodplains. Equally problematic is 
the fact that about one third of the land is exposed to tidal 
incursions, which refers to the mixing of saline and fresh 
water, and which is expected to expand as tidal zones 
spread inland from sea level rise.
Overall, climate change could decrease agricultural GDP 
by 3.1 % each year during 2005–50.45 That’s a cumulative 
USD 36 billion in lost value-added. According to the World 
Bank, salinization issues in Bangladesh will most likely lead 
to significant shortages of drinking water and irrigation 
problems by 2050 and may result in a decline in rice yield 
by 15.6 %.46 A separate analysis suggests Bangladesh may 
incur a financial impact of about USD 3.2 billion on average 
annually due to cyclones and floods, about 2.2 % of GDP.47 
Increased intensity of storms and the potential for greater 
saltwater intrusion in rivers are likely to disrupt the normal 
annual salinization cycle. In addition, inland monsoon 
flooding is likely to become an even greater risk: a 1998 
storm inundated48 over two thirds of Bangladesh and cost 
4.8% of GDP.49 Climate change places an additional 4%  
of land area at risk from the inundations caused by  
monsoon flooding.50
Adaptation and resilience 
In the case of Bangladesh, there are many climate impacts 
that have the potential to cause economic damage and 
widespread human suffering. From the narrower perspective 
of fiscal health, the impact of freshwater flooding on 
rice production stands out as a key economic indicator. 
Bangladesh imports rice for domestic consumption to 
make up for any domestic production shortfalls, even in a 
normal agricultural year. In the event of significant domestic 
shortfalls, imports will need to increase, negatively affecting 
the country’s trade deficits. In addition, material increases  
in food inflation remain a concern.
Based on historical data, natural hazard events in 
Bangladesh cost more than USD 10 billion in economic 
losses from 2000 to 2013, but the total funding available, for 
relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction for the same period 
was only USD 2 billion.51 Many of the initiatives to date are 
preliminary, such as some of the measures being taken 
to combat rising salinity levels, and some involve external 
financing – in February 2018, a total of USD 80 million 
was approved for climate change adaptation initiatives 
in Bangladesh, Georgia, and Zambia through the Green 
Climate Fund, led by UNDP.52 
Some of these efforts could be further buttressed by greater 
utilization of existing natural capital resources to rebuild the 
natural infrastructure. There is currently a program underway 
to mitigate some of the current threats to mangrove 
forests,53 which range from upstream agricultural practices 
to industrial development at the periphery of these areas. 
More broadly, there is now increasing interest in assessing 
the potential for natural capital factors to contribute to 
adaptation and mitigation efforts.54 Work is being done to 
improve the effectiveness of salt-tolerant rice grains55 and 
devise projects to build solar-powered desalination plants.56
Currently, three disaster risk finance solutions are 
considered effective in Bangladesh: sovereign disaster risk 
contingent credit, parametric sovereign risk insurance, and 
disaster risk microfinance portfolio insurance. Bangladesh 
is currently piloting a flood insurance program, with the 
support of several external agencies and insurers, under  
the direction of the Swiss Agency for Development  
and Cooperation.57 
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4.2 Barbados
In summary
Barbados represents a good example of the long-term impacts, and negative rating 
implications, that a significant one-time economic event can generate. Significant 
storm damage on the order of that generated by Hurricanes Harvey and Maria 
elsewhere in the Caribbean in 2017 would have a comparable effect. Developing 
natural capital approaches to minimizing physical impacts, and broader participation 
in risk-transfer partnerships, could help ensure more rapid recoveries, which would 
produce lower impacts on the country’s credit profile.
Current S&P Ratings assessment: CCC+ (Negative)  
(Foreign long-term rating)/CCC (Domestic long-term rating)
Climate risk being assessed: Severe weather events
Key near-term indicators:
Tourist numbers
Major storm damage
Longer-term climate issues:
Increased frequency and severity of tropical storm events
Sea level rise reducing beach area
Economic vulnerabilities
As Moody’s discussed in its report on small island nations58, 
as well as its separate report on climate risks for Fiji, small 
island nations are expected to suffer a range of impacts from 
climate change. In aggregate, these impacts could reduce 
small islands’ GDP by 4% by 2030. In 2016, the value of disaster 
effects arising from Tropical Cyclone Winston in Fiji, was 
estimated to amount to F$2 billion (USD 0.9 billion), which is 
more than 20% of Fiji's current GDP.59
Unlike Fiji, Barbados does not have significant natural 
resources. Rather, Barbados has significant exposure to two 
industries – tourism and financial services. Following the 
unfolding of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, GDP growth in 2009 
was -4.1%, compared to an average of 2.8% over the period 
2002-2007 (5.7% GDP growth rate in 2007.) Barbados has 
yet to fully recover from the impact of this event. GDP growth 
was 0% for several years following the crisis, and only in the 
past two years has GDP growth reached, or raised above, 
1%. During this period, Barbados’s S&P rating declined from 
A- in 2008 to CCC (Negative Watch) today. This ratings decline 
occurred without the physical damage that affected Fiji, or 
Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic and other, more northerly 
Caribbean islands, in 2017. Government debt currently stands 
at about 154% of GDP, and the country’s new government 
has indicated 'urgent action' is required to deal with the debt 
problem.60 Barbados currently is limited in its ability to issue 
new debt without external assistance.
Physical indicator
Storm 
damage
Tourist 
numbers
Economic indicator Rating indicator reviews
Government 
borrowing
Fiscal  
assessment
GDP
Economic  
assessment
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Climate vulnerabilities 
Barbados ranks 54 out of 181 countries in the ND-GAIN 
Country index of climate vulnerability and its readiness to 
improve resilience, with relatively modest vulnerability and 
strong readiness measures.61 However, this ranking has 
declined over the past decade, almost entirely due to the 
weakening economy and declining governance measures, 
offsetting a mild improvement in vulnerability measures. 
Barbados benefits from having a relatively low percentage 
of land within five meters of sea level – about 15%. Still, 
Moody’s assesses Barbados’s vulnerability to climate 
risks as relatively high, although not as high as some other 
Caribbean nations. However, as the Fifth Assessment Report 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
has pointed out, 60% of resort properties in the Caribbean 
would be damaged by a one-meter rise in sea level.62 Insured 
losses in Barbados over the past several decades have been 
substantially lower than elsewhere in the Caribbean. But 
the likelihood of comparable damage will increase as the 
likelihood of severe storms increases. 
Adaptation and resilience 
Barbados has undertaken a number of adaptation and 
mitigation measures to anticipate the impacts of climate 
change. These include some measures of coastal defense, 
and a recent initiative to pilot solar and wind power on the 
island. Given the island’s current dependence on imported 
oil to generate the island’s electricity, reducing such 
dependence would improve Barbados’ external balances by 
removing the potential volatility associated with oil imports. 
Broader economic and ecological resilience measures may 
be harder to achieve, given the difficulties in diversifying a 
small island economy.
The government’s recent initiative to assess the natural 
capital of Barbados, particularly its marine ecosystems, 
appears a welcome development. For example, a project 
being funded by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(Enhancing Capacity for Coastal Management with 
Ecosystem Services in Barbados) in conjunction with a 
number of scientific organizations and NGOs will assess 
coastal zone management from a natural capital perspective, 
including the potential for natural infrastructure development. 
Further initiatives along these lines for the island’s full range 
of ecosystems would facilitate decision-making regarding 
keeping tourism central to the Barbadian economy and 
providing some degree of resilience to the island’s economy 
in the event of severe events.
Barbados participates in the Caribbean Catastrophe  
Risk Insurance Facility. However, as noted earlier, insured  
and uninsured losses have been low relative to other 
Caribbean nations.
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4.3 Guatemala
In summary
Guatemala’s drought exposure has the potential to generate sufficient economic 
costs that would lead to increased government borrowings and a negative impact 
on agricultural exports; either event could weaken the country’s credit profile and 
increase borrowing costs. More critically, negative impacts on maize production 
would result in higher government borrowing for measures to address social 
dislocation impacts. Minimizing drought impacts through aggressive reforestation 
efforts should remain a priority for helping to retain credit stability.
Current S&P Ratings aessessment: BB- (Foreign long-term 
rating)/BB (Domestic long-term rating)
Climate risk being assessed: Drought
Key near-term indicators:
Deforestation rates
Maize production yields
Changes in agricultural and arable land
Longer-term climate issues:
Increased drought frequency and severity, increasing social 
dislocation and social costs
More severe and frequent droughts, with increased 
government borrowings to deal with impacts of increased 
social dislocation
Economic vulnerabilities
Guatemala’s GDP growth has been relatively strong in  
recent years. Much of this growth has been driven by  
exports of agricultural products (with bananas and sugar 
cane the leading crop exports) and light manufactured 
goods. In the latter category, Guatemala competes with 
other emerging market countries for developed country 
manufacturing facilities. 
Nonetheless, the Guatemalan economy demonstrates some 
significant vulnerabilities, which have contributed to GDP 
per capita being about half the Latin American average. 
The country suffers from significant income inequality and 
a critical need for infrastructure expansion. The IMF noted 
in 2017, “At less than 1% of GDP, public infrastructure 
investment in Guatemala is among the lowest in Latin 
America and emerging markets. The resulting infrastructure 
gap constrains Guatemala’s future growth and living 
standards”63 Sovereign debt to GDP currently stands at about 
24%, and has remained relatively constant over the past 
decade, suggesting some room for additional borrowings.
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Climate vulnerabilities 
Guatemala ranks 112 out of 181 countries in the ND-GAIN 
Country index. Despite this ranking improving over the past 
two decades, it is still the 70th most vulnerable country 
and the 64th least ready country. It has both a great need 
for investment and innovations to improve readiness and 
a great urgency for action64. Vulnerability remains high in a 
number of areas, including exposure to warm periods and 
natural capital depletion. Situated in the 'dry corridor' of 
Central America, Guatemala regularly suffers from multi-year 
droughts. Droughts in this region have a direct impact on 
agricultural production, which employed over 29% of the 
country’s population in 2016 and into 2017.65 Droughts can 
destroy up to 50-90% of the harvest in some areas in the dry 
corridor and may contribute to growing inequalities between 
the most vulnerable groups who are hardest hit.66 Over the 
past decade, losses in Guatemala linked to all climate-related 
events amounted to USD 5 billion, according to the official 
statement made by Guatemala at the UN Disaster Reduction 
meeting during the COP event in Mexico in May 2017.67
Critically, agriculture still represents close to 30% of exports68, 
thus constituting an important source of foreign earnings 
and access to foreign capital. Key indicators of the potential 
economic impacts of climate-related drought risks will come 
from this economic sector. An impact of recurring droughts 
has been increased rates of deforestation. Guatemala has 
lost more than a quarter of its forests since 1990, with forest 
cover representing only 33% of total land area in 2015, 
down from over 44% in 1990.69 Over the longer term, forest 
loss is a significant contributor to topsoil loss, so total land 
productivity tends to trend downwards. 
Second, while maize production is not necessarily critical 
to agricultural exports, it is critical to subsistence farming 
for much of the population. While production of bananas 
and sugar cane, each representing USD 1 billion in annual 
exports, have almost doubled over the last decade, other 
smaller staples like maize have stagnated relatively, with 
an 8% decrease in overall yield over this period. Negative 
impacts on maize production and yields are likely to drive up 
social dislocation costs. 
Third, the total amount of land devoted to agriculture, for 
both domestic consumption and subsistence and for export, 
is likely to be negatively affected by increasing drought 
severity and frequency. While there has been an increase 
in permanent cropland since 2005, there has also been an 
overall loss of agricultural and arable land during this same 
period – from 56% of total land area in 2005 to 43% in 2015. 
Adaptation and resilience 
Guatemala has a national climate change fund to finance 
adaptation and mitigation projects, and some 80% of the fund 
will be mandated to fund risk and vulnerability management 
issues and adaptation projects. 
While some efforts have been ongoing for the past 25 years 
to replant trees, educating the population to the benefits of 
keeping forest cover has been one of the biggest challenges, 
along with lack of funding.70 This makes reforestation a 
means to both mitigate and adapt to the effects climate 
change. This is one of the objectives of the recent National 
Adaptation Plan,71 part of an adaptation capacity-building 
program funded through the Global Environment Fund and 
implemented by UNDP.72 
Guatemala has invested over USD 270 million over the past 
16 years in reforestation, benefiting an estimated 900,000 
people whose livelihoods depend directly on forests.73 There 
are also ongoing programs with both multilateral agencies 
and NGOs to expand these efforts. For instance, Guatemala is 
one of the first countries to implement the Forest Investment 
Plan74, backed directly by international institutions including 
the World Bank, IADB, and the UN-REDD program. NGOs like 
the Alliance for International Reforestation have also been 
present for decades to implement programs that increase 
the resilience among local populations by finding sustainable 
alternatives to the illegal forest clearing they often depend on. 
Much of Guatemala’s efforts have been devoted to a broader 
range of climate shocks, not just drought. However, we 
believe that such an indicator as forest cover and its rate 
of change may be a useful indicator not only of climate 
impacts, but also of potential resilience to economic shocks. 
Guatemala has one of the more advanced efforts at natural 
capital assessment. Since 2014, the government has been 
working in conjunction with the World Bank’s WAVES 
program (Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem 
Services) to update the 2006 Natural Capital assessment. 
Guatemala has developed a comprehensive National 
Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, now in its second 
iteration. In addition, since 2016 microinsurance has been 
piloted by the Microinsurance Catastrophe Risk Organization 
(MiCRO), incorporating detailed risk analysis as the basis of 
payouts to rural farmers in the event of natural catastrophes. 
This program is similar to a program introduced in Kenya  
with some success.75
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4.4 Kenya
In summary
Kenya’s vulnerability to drought impacts, particularly in terms of potential food 
inflation and social dislocation costs, represent a potential risk to Kenya’s credit 
stability through impacts on government borrowing levels, external debt, overall trade 
balances, and overall inflation. Programs to reduce the impact of drought on these 
fiscal and economic measures, in part through further risk-transfer programs, will  
help to prevent ratings deterioration.
Current S&P Ratings assessment: B+ (Foreign long-term 
rating/B+ (Domestic long-term rating)
Climate risk being assessed: Drought
Key near-term indicators:
Maize production
Maize imports and prices
Longer-term climate issues:
Persistent drought resulting in substantial food shortages
Increased coastal flooding risk, with resultant  
economic damage
Rising sea levels
Economic vulnerabilities
Kenya has a large rural population (76% as of 2016,  
according to the World Bank) with 49% of the country’s  
land devoted to agriculture. Agriculture employs about 
62% of the population, despite Kenya having a relatively  
low average level of precipitation.76
Kenya also has the largest trade deficit of the countries 
profiled in our case studies. The average trade deficit was 
5.9% of GDP in 2017,77 reaching as high as 6.2% in February 
2018. This increase was driven by a doubling of food 
imports and higher machinery imports. In addition, exports 
of agricultural goods were affected by drought. As a result, 
foreign reserves have been declining. 
Figure 13. Kenya's trade deficit
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Source: Compiled with data from the World Bank.
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However, foreign exchange reserves of USD 7.1 billion  
(4.7 months of import cover), coupled with arrangements 
with the IMF of USD 1.5 billion, are seen as some degree of 
protection against short-term trade deficits. Nonetheless, 
Kenya remains vulnerable to foreign exchange volatility. 
Foreign debt continues to rise. S&P has cautioned the 
country on this issue. Government debt currently stands  
at about 57%.
While Kenya’s economy has remained a strong performer, 
with 2017 GDP growth at 4.7%, and CPI down to a 
manageable 4.5%, millions of vulnerable communities 
suffered from much higher food inflation during the year that 
was directly attributable to the persistent drought. 
Climate vulnerabilities 
Kenya ranks 151 out of 181 countries in the ND-GAIN 
Country index (in the bottom 20%), a modest decline over 
the past two decades. While most readiness measures have 
improved, overall it has a low readiness score and needs to 
prioritize investment in innovation and education. Kenya’s 
vulnerability measures have deteriorated, particularly those 
associated with food and ecosystem services78. According 
to the Stockholm Environment Institute, Kenya is exposed to 
a potential loss of 2.6% of GDP annually through 2030 as a 
result of the impacts of climate events and trends.79
The government declared a drought emergency in February 
2017. Climate vulnerability manifests itself in food prices 
during periods of drought. As the UN Environment ERISC 
Phase II report suggested, Kenya stands to suffer a 4.4% loss 
of GDP in the case of a doubling of food prices from drought 
events. The price of maize and beans (often consumed 
together) are the most indicative of any drought situation.80 
As shown in Figure 14, Kenya had 21% food price inflation 
between April 2016 and April 2017.81 
Figure 14. Soaring food costs pushed inflation  
rates higher in Kenya
Spikes in food inflation have significant implications for 
vulnerable populations. Internal migration tends to increase 
during drought periods, bringing attendant social costs. 
Drought also is a significant contributor to food insecurity and 
malnutrition costs, which put a strain on government finances.
Maize imports are a critical measure of drought risk impacts, 
with higher levels of imports associated with extended 
periods of drought. Maize prices thus prove to be a key 
indicator of the impact of drought risk on several credit 
metrics, particularly food inflation and import requirements. 
If sufficiently large, these may affect external balances. 
Outbreaks of fall armyworm, associated with drought, have 
made a significant impact on yields on maize and wheat. 
Climate-related pest infestations clearly have an impact on 
food price inflation.
The impacts of drought are of concern to rating agencies 
as it impacts government borrowing levels, external debt, 
overall external balances, and overall inflation. Programs to 
reduce the impact of drought on these fiscal and economic 
measures will help to prevent ratings deterioration, with a 
resulting increase in interest costs. To date, none of these 
factors has been sufficient to change Kenya’s credit profile. 
Adaptation and resilience 
The Kenyan government has undertaken a number of 
programs to deal with adaptation issues. USAID is funding 
a variety of adaptation efforts designed to address river 
vulnerability issues and natural resource management 
concerns. Dealing with drought, however, involves multiple 
levels of resilience preparation. Many of these involve adoption 
and implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. 
Kenya, unlike Guatemala, is not heavily forested, but 
deforestation nonetheless has been a trend for a number 
of years. However, its utility as a drought indicator is more 
limited because of the low level of forestation in the first place. 
Still, there are a number of forest preservation programs in 
place. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has issued 
'forest bonds,' where the proceeds are intended for use for 
forest conservation in Kenya. In this case, interest is being 
paid in the form of cash or carbon credits. Even here, though, 
there was a need for additional external support from BHP, 
a large mining company, which pays the cash interest. The 
principal will be paid upon maturity by the IFC. 
The Kenyan government is involved in several national or pan-
East African initiatives to ensure better management of drought 
emergencies. While these initiatives will have no impact on 
drought incidence, the government is moving towards a more 
systematic set of efforts to manage drought emergencies. Other 
efforts are more targeted, relating to the most recent UN FAO 
Flash Appeal, which has among its objectives the strengthening 
of the resilience of drought-affected communities and 
mitigating the humanitarian impacts of drought emergencies. 
The overall goal is to reduce 'drought aid dependency'.82 
There is now a concerted effort to develop local insurance 
markets, particularly for agriculture. Kenya’s Livestock 
Insurance program83 currently provides insurance for about 
24,000 farmers, but the government plans on expanding the 
program to include 100,000 farmers by 2020. More financial 
options are being developed. The FAO’s African Disaster Risk 
Financing Initiative (ADRF) is a notable example.84
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4.5 Vietnam
In summary
Vietnam’s economic profile is likely to be negatively affected by coastal flooding 
impacts, which will negatively impact rice production, and generate significant social 
dislocation effects. Current programs in coastal management and salinity infusion 
need to be aggressively expanded to minimize these economic impacts, which would 
likely result in credit profile deterioration and increased borrowing costs.
Current S&P Global Ratings assessment: BB- (Foreign long-
term rating) /BB- (Domestic long-term rating)
Climate risk being assessed: Coastal flooding
Key near-term indicators:
Increased river salinization from coastal flooding  
and sea level rise
Rice yields
Loss of land area devoted to agriculture
Longer-term climate and economic concerns:
Changes in agricultural production in response to increased 
salinization, or reduced land devoted to agriculture
Food price inflation resulting from shortfall in domestic  
rice production
Increased government borrowing to fund population 
dislocations
Economic vulnerabilities
Vietnam’s GDP has doubled over the past eight years.85 The 
country has developed an export markets and implemented 
government reforms that are creating a transition from a 
centrally planned economy. A key plank of government 
reforms were incentives for rice production that would not  
just meet the needs of the population but create a major 
export product. Vietnam has been generating trade  
surpluses since 2012. 
Vietnam is now a significant rice exporter to other Asian 
countries. Rice accounts for 90% of total domestic cereal 
production. It is the staple food for 95% of the population and 
an important source of income for 60 million people. Rice 
farms are generally small in size: only 2% rice farms throughout 
the country cover more than two hectares land and 47% of 
farms are smaller than 0.2 hectares.86 One of the most vital 
components of Vietnam’s economy is based on hundreds of 
small-scale farms, owned by individual land owners/farmers. 
The majority of these farms are located in land areas very 
exposed to coastal flooding and sea level rise risks.
In June 2017 Vietnam was disqualified from further 
development funding from the World Bank, although it is 
remains a 'blended borrower' from the Asian Development 
Bank. However, as rating agency comments have indicated, 
any increase in external borrowings at present could be 
problematic for maintaining the country’s current ratings. 
Sovereign debt to GDP currently stands at about 61%, a level 
that has nearly doubled over the past decade.87
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Climate vulnerabilities
Vietnam ranks 96 out of 181 countries in the ND-GAIN Country 
index88, a ranking that has been improving over the past 
two decades from an increase in readiness and a decline in 
vulnerability measures. Nonetheless, two crucial vulnerability 
measures, projected change in sea level rise impacts, and 
projected change of flood hazard, remain very high. Investment 
in dam capacity is required. Despite its recent economic gains, 
it faces significant vulnerabilities from rising seas, river flooding 
and the resulting salinization and groundwater issues. Over 15% 
of all of Vietnam’s land is below five meters above sea level. In 
total, 37% of Vietnam’s population – or about 34 million people 
– live in this area. Coastal flooding risks are expected to increase 
with the severity of tropical storms, and this may have direct 
population impacts. Moreover, increased coastal flooding may 
well affect access to fresh water, with significant impacts on both 
local populations and local economies. 
As with Bangladesh, salinization of rivers and other freshwater 
sources is significant concern for Vietnam. Salinization has 
multiple negative impacts for freshwater ecosystems, including 
the availability of groundwater, its effect on rice yields, and 
the amount of water available for both human and animal 
consumption and for irrigation.89 More than half of Vietnam’s 
rice crop is grown in the Mekong Delta. Forecasts up to 2050 
suggest that not only could rice yields decline by an estimated 
10-15% as a result of climate trends, but rice prices could 
increase by as much as one third in that event.90
Adaptation and resilience
The Vietnamese government has been monitoring salinity 
infusion in various river deltas since 1991, and there has been 
considerable modeling of the extent, and potential effects, 
of this process. In response, the government has created a 
Government National Climate Change Committee, to oversee 
the various National Climate Change Strategies passed by 
the government over the past 10 years, including a whole 
range of programs designed for adaptation and mitigation. 
Many of these programs receive external support from 
NGPs and foreign government agencies such as USAID. 
These include coastal zone management programs ranging 
from full protection; involving strengthening and elevating 
embankments to withdrawal from potentially affected areas. 
Given the length of Vietnam’s coastline (3,440 kilometres), 
this is an ambitious program. We note that in conjunction 
to various agriculture measures described below, the 
government has introduced various measures directed  
at reforestation, including mangrove restoration. 
In addition, the government has put forward various 
measures to protect agricultural production, including  
soil preservation measures, as well as accelerating a shift 
to more climate-appropriate crops. The government has 
also begun to implement a variety of water sustainability 
measures, including upgrading water infrastructure, and 
adding new infrastructure as appropriate. New for 2018,  
is a more inclusive approach: ecosystem-based adaptation 
(EbA)91. Traditional flood management structures, such as 
dikes, which vulnerable communities depend on, can have 
negative impacts on the environment. Two EbA measures will 
be implemented in Thua Thien Hue Province jointly with  
the Disaster Management Centre, the Women’s Union  
and local communities.92
All of these measures require financing. The government, 
in conjunction with the World Bank, has issued a report 
outlining the various means at its disposal for financing 
these projects93, with the majority of expenditures directed at 
food and water security. We note that development partners 
have provided about 30% of the funding required for these 
proposals to date, although whether this level of support will 
be maintained remains unclear.
Vietnam has begun to undertake broader risk transfer 
programs. Every year, natural disasters and epidemics have 
caused significant losses for the Vietnamese agricultural 
sector and farmers, accounting for 1.5% of the national 
GDP. Agricultural insurance has become an urgent need. 
After a pilot during the years 2013-2016, in which 300,000 
households gained agriculture insurance worth USD 340m, 
the state is expected to subsidize insurance fees of up to 20% 
for farmers and 90% of poor households this year.
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5. Conclusions 
Vulnerable countries face not just economic losses from climate 
impacts, but also an increasing fiscal burden. The major credit 
rating agencies have discussed climate risks as being potentially 
material to sovereign ratings. Our work indicates that interest 
rates on V20 government debt are already higher than they 
would otherwise be, due to climate vulnerability. This effect  
has a broad impact on national measures of the cost of capital. 
We estimate that exposure to climate risks has increased  
the cost of debt for V20 countries by 117 basis points, on 
average. In absolute terms, that translated into more than  
USD 40 billion in additional interest payments over the past  
10 years on government debt alone. Incorporating higher 
sovereign borrowing rates into the cost of private external debt 
reveals that climate risks have cost debt-issuing V20 countries 
over USD 62 billion in higher interest payments across the public 
and private sectors. As we noted in Section 3, these additional 
costs are projected to balloon to between USD 146 – 168 billion 
over the next decade.
Vulnerable countries face the unenviable task of managing 
the financial costs of climate change increase as the physical 
impacts of climate risks themselves accelerate. National 
governments need to develop programs that will preserve 
physical and economic resilience to minimize these costs. 
Governments wishing to borrow internationally critically need  
to monitor the fiscal factors that could affect a country’s 
sovereign credit profile. This is particularly true for the large 
number of climate-vulnerable countries that are not in a position 
to issue international sovereign debt because they lack an 
investment grade credit rating or are limited in further issuance 
by current debt levels. 
Improved resilience will not only help safeguard sovereign credit 
profiles, but also has the potential to increase the rate of return 
for investment. Overall, we see broad economic, fiscal and social 
benefits from building greater economic and social resilience 
 to climate change. Our research suggests that investing in 
social preparedness reduces cost of debt by 67 basis points,  
on average. In addition to traditional fiscal policies, programs 
that address social inequality, ICT infrastructure, education  
and innovation are crucial to strengthening national  
adaption capacity.
The process of identifying critical indicators that are of interest 
to rating agencies and bond market participants can be a useful 
tool for managing climate risks at the country level. In our case 
studies, we assessed one specific climate impact for each 
country. In many cases, changes in output in the agriculture 
sector were identified as having the greatest potential to 
ultimately lead to actions by rating agencies. In practice,  
national governments will need to track a much broader range  
of economic indicators. We hope this report serves as good 
guide for how that can be done on a bottom-up basis.
Our findings are consistent with other studies that have 
demonstrated a financial burden to developing countries 
from climate change.94 As noted in this report, there are 
several market and policy initiatives that can play a role in 
reducing this burden. From a financial perspective, effective 
climate adaptation initiatives must accomplish at least one of 
the following three goals: reduce economic costs, improve 
economic recoveries, and/or transfer financial risks. These 
goals are not meant to be mutually exclusive. Given that 
countries will likely face increased costs as climate impacts 
become more severe, policy responses must be scalable to 
meet the growing sense of urgency.
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Reducing economic losses
In our case studies, we highlighted adaptation programs 
designed to reduce economic loses from climate events. 
From a financial perspective, there appears to be a business 
case for restoring natural capital that acts as climate-resilient 
infrastructure. While the lag times associated with these 
investments make cost-benefit analysis difficult, there is 
a growing opportunity for 'natural climate solutions.'95 For 
example, a recent report on flood protection through natural 
infrastructure noted that the “largest opportunities for funding 
are in the redirection of post-disaster recovery funds to pre-
disaster investments in risk reduction”.96 The authors point to the 
European Investment Bank’s Natural Capital Financing Facility 
as a model. Investments in adaptation will over the long-term 
be a more efficient use of expenditures than insurance, which 
allows for improved speed of economic recoveries but does not 
act to prevent the occurrence of event-related costs. 
As rating agencies repeatedly have commented, the lack of a 
well-developed physical infrastructure in V20 countries needs 
to be addressed, not only for greater resilience in dealing with 
climate impacts, but more generally for reasons of economic 
development. We note in Section 3 that infrastructure 
development plays an important role in reducing climate 
vulnerability. Given the frequent limitations on the ability to 
borrow, other mechanisms for improving infrastructure need to 
be considered. In particular, public-private partnerships in areas 
such as transportation infrastructure may need to be expanded 
in situations where public borrowing options are limited. In 
addition to facilitating infrastructure development that reduces 
economic losses, the inclusion of the private sector may help 
transfer some of the associated economic risks.
'Green bonds' have been put forward as a possible option to 
fund not just infrastructure upgrades, but also a wide range of 
adaptation and mitigation investments. Green bonds are indeed 
an attractive option for those countries that actually are able to 
issue international debt. Fiji and Kenya both issued sovereign 
green bonds in 2017. The majority of countries in the Climate 
Vulnerable Forum, however, do not have sovereign credit ratings. 
These countries generally are not able to issue international 
debt, or, if rated, may be constrained from issuing further 
amounts. For these countries, such issuance would require 
external support for the costs incurred through such debt 
issuance, such as those mentioned below. The International 
Finance Corporation’s 'forest bonds,' discussed previously, 
could serve as a model for financing structures that employ 
partial guarantees from higher-credit quality issuers such as 
multilateral lenders and large corporates.
Improving the speed of economic recoveries 
Many initiatives in the V20 countries seek to create the 
conditions for more rapid recoveries from extreme weather 
shocks and long-term climatic trends. The development of 
more sophisticated domestic debt capital markets would  
help diversify sources of funding and build financial resilience 
to these external shocks. The recent growth in the number 
of local currency bond markets in developing countries is an 
encouraging trend in this direction.97 However, this option is 
not available to all V20 countries in the short term. Likewise, 
GDP-indexed bonds may be useful for V20 countries,  
but only those that already have access to international  
capital markets.98
Developing markets for local insurance is a necessity for 
more rapid recoveries from climate shocks and trends. In 
most V20 countries, insurance is not a realistic option for 
a broad section of the population. This is a critical issue in 
countries that regularly experience catastrophic weather 
events, endure economic losses that are mostly uninsured, 
and are expecting further increases in the severity/frequency 
of extreme weather events. In some cases, national 
governments do provide selected insurance options. Kenya’s 
drought insurance program is one example. Such programs 
are not widely available across the V20.
Sovereign catastrophe risk pools would enable climate-
vulnerable countries to protect public budgets in a disaster 
situation and to access more rapid financing for disaster 
response. Catastrophe risk pools allow countries to pool 
risks in a diversified portfolio; retain some risk through joint 
reserves/capital; and transfer excess risk to the reinsurance 
and capital markets.99 Examples of existing regional risk 
pools include the aforementioned Caribbean Catastrophe 
Risk Insurance Facility, the Pacific Disaster Risk Financing 
and Insurance Program, and the African Risk Capacity.100 
A recent international effort to address this problem is the 
InsuResilience Global Partnership for Climate and Disaster 
Risk Finance and Insurance Solutions,101 which may provide 
a useful framework for designing risk finance and insurance 
solutions for V20 countries.
Transferring financial risks 
The relatively weak economic situation of V20 countries 
may require that the costs of climate risks be absorbed more 
widely. Financial protection can be accomplished most 
immediately via sovereign risk transfer solutions. Since 
the 1990s, a number of different mechanisms of sovereign 
risk transfer have been developed. Insurance-linked 
securities such as catastrophe bonds, for example, are 
debt instruments that transfer a specific set of risks (usually 
natural disaster risks) from an issuer to investors. A recent 
report from the World Bank reviewed a variety of risk-pooling 
models of potential use by V20 countries.102 It is worth noting 
that these risk-pooling measures do not necessarily reduce 
economic costs associated with climate shocks, but they 
do have the potential to transfer a significant amount of the 
financial costs to other parties.
There is considerable scope for expanding existing risk-
transfer solutions. National efforts to preserve sovereign 
credit profiles will be necessary going forward, given the 
potential for increased climate-related costs and the need 
to finance these. Whether these will be sufficient will in part 
depend on the willingness of the international community 
to absorb some of the costs of these risks. It may be that the 
most effective way for the international community to support 
such initiatives is through measures designed to stabilize and 
support sovereign credit profiles.
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Appendix
Econometric approach
As a baseline specification, a panel ordinary least squares 
(POLS) model is estimated: 
Yt =a+bxt +yzt +et 
where the dependent variable yt denotes country bond yields, 
b is a k × 1 coefficient vector, xt is a k × 1 vector of climate-
related variables, y is a p × 1 coefficient vector, zit is a p × 1 
vector of controls. Although a is a k × 1 vector, all the intercepts 
are assumed to be identical within this framework. Subscript 
t is the year. We conduct multiple regressions to test the 
significance of the set of climate variables and controls. 
The model is a linear regression model and hence all the 
standard assumptions apply (OLS assumptions: linearity, 
spherical error terms, exogeneity). To obtain the predictions, 
conditional expected values of the dependent variable 
are taken considering an average V20 country. Hence, the 
average of the V20 sub-sample of explanatory variables is 
used to derive linear predictions of base cost of debt for the 
average V20 country, climate risk and social preparedness. 
Mechanically this multiplies the coefficients estimated by the 
model with the variables themselves. We can then observe the 
mean, median and standard deviation for members of the V20 
group of climate-vulnerable countries. The base effect is the 
predicted cost of debt minus the partial climate risk and social 
preparedness effects. 
We assume that parameters are constant, i.e. the partial 
impact of climate risk on cost of debt does not change 
over time. Furthermore, our model only identifies the direct 
effect of climate risk on cost of debt; indirect effects through 
macroeconomic variables are not modeled. This also includes 
interventions such as IMF support, which is assumed to be 
exogenous, i.e. independent from climate risk. The results are 
presented in Table 3.
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Table 3. Determinants of yields
  
A
 
B
 
C
 
D
Note: Statistics in parentheses. All models refer to POLS using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
SCORE climate risk measure based on 
ND-GAIN sensitivity and capacity indices
0.146***
(-3.88)
-1.557***
(-5.37)
0.000**
(-3.3)
-0.010***
(-12.78)
-0.185***
(-11.34)
0.182***
(-12.22)
0.150***
(-10.88)
0.006***
(-3.62)
0.024*
(-2.20)
-1.764***
(-6.06)
0.000***
(-3.74)
-0.010***
(-12.80)
-0.171***
(-9.91)
0.172***
(-11.04)
0.140***
(-9.77)
0.006***
(-3.60)
0.026*
(-2.51)
-0.227**
(-2.65)
-1.541***
(-5.31)
0.000**
(-3.14)
-0.010***
(-12.83)
-0.178***
(-10.61)
0.178***
(-11.75)
0.145***
(-10.40)
0.006***
(-3.52)
0.018
(-1.75)
-0.271**
(-3.15)
0.197***
(-3.62)
-2.410***
(-6.38)
0.000
(-1.96)
-0.010***
(-14.35)
-0.168***
(-10.21)
0.160***
(-10.44)
0.112***
(-7.22)
0.006**
(-3.02)
0.019
(-1.90)
-0.300***
(-3.81)
0.162**
(-3.12)
0.974***
(-5.18)
0.176***
(-4.59)
0.135***
(-3.63)
0.081*
(-2.07)
ND-GAIN social readiness index
Per capita gross domestic product
Primary balance to GDP
Gross government debt to GDP
Annual change in consumer price
V20 climate vulnerable 
forum member dummy
Government revenues to GDP
Foreign direct investment to GDP
G7 advanced economy 
group member dummy
Government expenditures to GDP
IMF multilateral debt dummy
aic
bic
Adjusted R2
N
361.649
400.593
0.739
363
357.925
400.763
0.742
363
350.024
396.757
0.748
363
322.297
372.925
0.767
363
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